Considerable efforts are being deployed to reduce illegal forestry activities in the Congo basin forests, but these efforts seem to be concentrated on illegal timber logging and wildlife poaching to the neglect of other illegal forest activities such as Non Timber Forests Products (NTFP) harvesting and trade. This paper applies a choice experiment approach to evaluate policy options that are hypothesised to provide incentives for small scale forest actors to comply with the forestry law governing trade in NTFP in Cameroon. Data was collected from 70 traders. Based on willingness to pay measures, it was revealed that the options most preferred by the sampled traders included a decentralisation of the application process to obtain permits and a reduction in the volume of paper work involved in the process. The authors conclude that acknowledging the preferences of small scale actors can be relevant in reducing illegality in the forestry sector.
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Vol. 15 • No. 2