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9 September 2019 Eco-Compensation Standard under River Basin Control: A Perspective from Asymmetric Game
Yinhong Dong, Qi Zheng, Lili Fu
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Dong, Y.; Zheng, Q., and Fu, L., 2019. Eco-compensation standard under river basin control: A perspective from asymmetric game. In: Gong, D.; Zhu, H. and Liu, R. (eds). Selected Topics in Coastal Research: Engineering, Industry, Economy, and Sustainable Development. Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue No. 94, pp. 60–66. Coconut Creek (Florida), ISSN 0749-0208.

The research on ecological compensation has also been increasingly valued by scholars. This paper develops a new bi-level model and takes a case to test the feasibility of the model. Through the analysis of specific examples, this study found that: (1) The government will reduce enterprises' compensation and social welfare will decrease as the cost of consumption increases when consumers participate in the sewage treatment compensation; (2) Only when the sum of cost paid by consumers and the price compensation granted by the government increases, the enterprises' sewage treatment capacity will increase, so will the corporate profits. Therefore, this paper argues that it is necessary for the government to compensate the enterprises. Finally, based on the conclusions of the study, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.

©Coastal Education and Research Foundation, Inc. 2019
Yinhong Dong, Qi Zheng, and Lili Fu "Eco-Compensation Standard under River Basin Control: A Perspective from Asymmetric Game," Journal of Coastal Research 94(sp1), 60-66, (9 September 2019).
Received: 25 February 2019; Accepted: 16 April 2019; Published: 9 September 2019

bi-level programming model
Ecological compensation price
Stackelberg equilibrium
water resources compensation
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