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We present a general dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition, and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological, and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. We offer new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.
In May of 2010 a new management system based on harvest cooperatives called “sectors” was implemented in the U.S. Northeast Multispecies Groundfish Fishery. Sectors are self-organized, self-managed groups of fishermen that receive annual catch entitlements. We hypothesize that the success and longevity of these sectors is likely to depend, in part, on the relationships amongst the members including their degree of trust and ability to collaborate. The value of these relationships and the ability to cooperate is commonly referred to as social capital. Prior to the implementation of the new sector system, we conducted a survey to derive baseline measures of social capital for individual groundfish permit holders and sectors. We construct indices of bonding, bridging and linking social capital, information sharing, and trust. We explore correlations between these social capital indices, characteristic of the vessels in the sectors, and various measures of economic performance of sectors.
Incorporating catch or harvest rate information in repeated-choice recreation fishing demand models is challenging, since multiple sources of information may be available and detail on how harvest rates change within a season is often lacking. This article develops a theoretically consistent harvest expectations repeated mixed logit angling demand model that can be used to evaluate the contributions made by different sources of information in predicting observed patterns of fishery participation and trip frequency. In an application to saltwater salmon fishing in Alaska, we find that both of the two available harvest rate information sources contribute to better predictions and should be used. In addition, information on whether a species is being targeted makes a significant improvement to model performance. Model tests indicate that non-targeted species have a significant marginal utility and it is different from the marginal utility of targeted species. The median value of a fishing choice occasion is approximately $49 per angler, which translates to a season of fishing being valued at a little over $2,400 at the median per angler.
Many Pacific salmon populations have declined to levels that have prompted their listing under the Endangered Species Act. In order to protect these populations and provide harvest opportunities for recreational anglers, the fishery is often managed with separate regulations for wild and hatchery salmon. This article examines how the value of recreational fishing is affected by changes in wild and hatchery salmon regulations and catch rates in the Northwest region of the US. Using a discrete choice experiment, we estimate saltwater fishing trip preferences. We integrate the estimated preferences with auxiliary creel data in order to conduct simulations of willingness to pay that vary in bag limits and catch rates, conditioning on current fishery conditions. We find statistically significant differences between the recreational values for wild and hatchery salmon, and our simulations highlight the fact that these differences depend on baseline levels of catch rates and bag limits.